The Future of Conservatism (Short Version)

Since it appears – probably based on JD Vance’s comments implying the impending death of the libertarian grasp on GOP policy – to be a day for weighing in on the future of conservatism, this blog will endeavor to do the same.

Many rightists are taking the position that the post-Reagan consensus, where free marketers and social conservatives unite as an electoral force, is dead and gone.  I suppose there’s some truth to that.  Some of the less committed free marketers have bled to the Democrats due to that party’s more cosmopolitan approach to social issues, while the social conservative wing of the right has been buttressed by increasing numbers of cultural conservatives that used to vote Democratic (many of whom are only nominally, if at all, pro-life).

That said, the GOP is incapable of remaining an electorally governing party on the basis of social/cultural conservatism without a pretty large vote contribution from the free market wing of the party (the libertarians and more moderate suburban Republicans).  Moreover, the party’s politicians are overwhelmingly drawn from the market wing of the party (hence the reality that no major immigration bill was passed in 2017/18 even though something like additional border fencing/asylum reform was available to be and absolutely should have been done).

Accordingly, the GOP has two main paths going forward: (1) go all-in on the path of social/cultural conservatism, change its politicians (especially the non-Southern ones) radically over the next 10 years, and figure out how to gain major ground in the more conservative parts of the African and Hispanic electorates to form a viable national coalition; or (2) work within the traditional framework of classical liberals (these are free marketers) and religious conservatives to incorporate the cultural conservative mass that has joined since 2009 (recall that lots of those cultural conservatives voted for Obama all the way back in 2008).  How realistic does anyone think Option 1 is? (See Trump’s comments from three whole days ago for why; see also the absurdity of wholesale changes to the leadership class.)

Accepting that reality, the GOP is left with the path of figuring out where to go in its current configuration.  This author’s inclination is that the following, non-exhaustive list of policy proscriptions seem most probable: (1) the party will be hostile to illegal immigration (a position the business wing still struggled with even very recently) and interested in “better” legal immigration (i.e., some combination of merit and family-based admissions); (2) the “spray and pray” tariff policies of the Trump Administration will hit the scrap heap, but the suspicion of Chinese economic policies (and the expansionist Chinese foreign policy agenda) will actually increase; (3) the interests of the right-leaning entrepreneurship/small business class (which is now more than ever composed of Trump-loving skilled tradesmen) will overtake the interests of large corporations, which are much more reactionary to the cultural predilections of modern liberalism (this is probably favored by both the free marketers and social/cultural conservatives and may also differentiate the party from a growing corporatism among mainstream Democrats, who are keen on socially aware corporations and have added some former suburban GOPers, often employed by large corporations, to their ranks); (4) economic and social policy initiatives will focus more on the working through upper middle classes (that is, tax cuts “for the rich” will be pushed down the priority list and tax reform and pro-family government assistance, such as government support in the child care and educational arena, will become more central to GOP policy); (5) pro-life policies will remain sacrosanct (as they are non-negotiable for social conservatives); and (6) pro-Second Amendment positions will likewise remain untouchable (as they unite both the culturally conservative and libertarian wings of the party). 

Trump’s surprising ascension unmasks one additional, non-policy reality.  The issues where the GOP pushes the most will be most subject to the whims of any future GOP President because (a) that’s just the way it works, both presently and historically and (b) Trump has shown us more than anything that the galvanizing leaders in modern politics – where everything plays out on TV – have far more cache in the world of 24 hour news than they did when politics was a portion of 30 minutes on the nightly news.  Should any wing of the party desire the upper hand, it should be seeking someone influenced by Trump less on policy (other than immigration) and more on force of personality.

Bottom line, the GOP coalition of free marketers, social conservatives, and now cultural conservatives – and the policies such a coalition advances – is not going to be hugely recast barring some considerable changes in both leadership and appeal to minority groups.  It is likely to refocus what market-based conservatism means in America, not to abandon its market orientation.  Vance (and whatever allies he may have) may well find that kicking the market-first advocates to the curb is little more than a proposition of crushing electoral defeat, a sustained version of the 2018 midterms.