Liberation from Victory

On “Liberation Day” this past Wednesday, I sent a text message to a pro-MAGA group of professional business types, suggesting the real “Liberation Day” was the day before when the first signs of GOP politicians being “liberated” from electoral victories arrived. The less than charitable responses I received indicated I may have hit a sore spot, and also point to a Republican Party that has entirely lost its traditional ideological plot. If one thought the four-year period from 2021-24 was bad for Dems, the Republican Party now seeks to one up that Dem failure.

To expound on that somewhat vague opening paragraph, it was a big week in American politics on several fronts. First, the beleaguered Democratic Party showed its first signs of life in the second Trump era, overperforming in several elections in Florida and Wisconsin last week. Second, for the first time on the economic front, President Trump dramatically broke with Republican economy orthodoxy and went “full MAGA” on tariff policy. Here’s guessing that the impact of both will be profound on US politics the next four years.

1. Special elections in Florida and a judicial election in Wisconsin did not go well for Republicans.

The Democratic Party is currently at its low point in popularity in decades. In addition to typical partisan opposition from Republicans, its own voters rate it quite poorly. With that in mind, it seemed possible that Republicans might buck the usual trend of special and off year election underperformance this week, but Republicans were unequivocally denied on that front.

In Florida, two House of Representatives’ seats were up for election, one vacated by new National Security Advisor Mike Waltz (Florida-6) and the other opened up when Republican firebrand Matt Gaetz left for a more appropriate slot on right-wing network TV (Florida-1). Both seats were crushing GOP victories just five months ago, with Florida-6 going to the GOP by 30 and Florida-1 by roughly 35. Due to some candidate and money advantages, Dem overperformance in Florida-6 was fairly well expected, but Florida-1 appeared on cruise control for Republicans.

When the ballots were counted, Republicans retained both seats by about 15%. In Florida-6, such a margin shouldn’t raise many eyebrows. Preliminary assessments of voter turnout showed Dem overperformance (fairly common for the party out of power in special elections) and a somewhat divisive GOP candidate didn’t inspire confidence. However, a similar result in Florida-1 is heartburn-inducing for the American right. First, Matt Gaetz was something of an underperformer relative to Republican expectations, so getting him off the ballot should have aided GOP performance. Second, the relative partisan turnout in the 1st district of Florida indicated a rather substantial advantage for the GOP candidate, well above the 15% by which he won. Looking under the hood, it appears that Dems didn’t just overperform via increased engagement by their team, but instead handily won the persuasion battle among independents and via some crossover GOP voters.

Shifting to the northwest, Dems cemented a strong night with a crushing win in the Wisconsin Supreme Court contest featuring a guest appearance by Elon Musk (who spent $20M for the Republican-aligned candidate, against a Democratic-affiliated candidate who was also exceedingly well funded). When the ballots were counted, Dems won by a dominating 10%, a margin 11% better than Trump’s narrow victory in Wisconsin during 2024. With a huge off-year turnout, in excess of 85% the number of votes cast in the last Wisconsin gubernatorial election, Democrats appears to win both the turnout and persuasion battles in the Badger state.

Bottom line, overperforming considerably in off year elections is not determinative of the direction of American politics. It is, however, indicative that Democratic irritation with the politicians of Team Blue is unlikely to result in electoral harm to this side, that Dems remain highly motivated to vote against a MAGA-led Republican Party, and that the pendulum of persuasion is swinging back leftward.

2. Trump goes “Full MAGA” on trade.

Much to the surprise and chagrin of Wall Street – whose stock exchanges shed 10% of their value in two days of trading after the Trump tariff announcement – President Trump imposed massive new tariffs on virtually all key US trading partners.  Using a formula as much inspired by the trade deficit as actual tariffs imposed on American goods, the Trump tariff dragnet enmeshed several Antarctic islands only occupied by penguins and seals (who have, of course, been eating America’s lunch on the trade front, assuming said lunch is “fresh fish”).

More seriously, this may have been the single most “MAGA” move of the two Trump terms.  For the most part, Trump I was staffed by a combination of Trump insiders and Republican loyalists, resulting in a Trumpian iteration of standard GOP fare prior to the post-2020 election meltdown (and quite frankly, an Administration that had more policy successes than failures).  Trump II is being steered by a less restrained Trump and staffed by individuals far more loyal to Trump and far less beholden to traditional GOP orthodoxy.   Trump’s relentless (and successful) focus on the border and his various and sometimes contradictory machinations on the Russia-Ukraine War are examples of a greater focus on atypical right-wing positions more central to a MAGA platform.

However, those matters pale in comparison to an outright attack on the free market trading system anchored by the world’s biggest importer, the United States.  Built up over 80 years since the conclusion of World War 2, this system is anchored on the US dollar, bolstered by a burgeoning American economy, and sustained by the safe shipping lanes secured by the US Navy (the Houthis recently found out the hard way what happens when you target the free flow of goods in international waters).  And while many economists see America’s emergence as unambiguously the richest large nation on Earth as a feature of this system, MAGA views it as undercutting American manufacturing and the nation’s working men and women.  Trump’s tariffs – designed to repatriate manufacturing to the US while raising revenue at the “expense” of foreigners – is the central plank in a MAGA-focused Administration.

While the mid-term iteration of the tariffs is still unclear, as certain nations such as Argentina, Israel, and Vietnam seem intent on tearing down any remaining trade barriers with the US and potentially avoiding trade battles with the United States, the country’s biggest trading partners appear far more likely to resist Trump.  China has already responded with 34% tariffs on US products (to match Trump’s tariffs on theirs), Canada and Mexico are not caving to Trump’s previously established tariffs on their goods, and the European Union appears to have a number of both economic and political reasons to push back against the Trump tariff regime.  While Trump’s free market defenders bleat that the tariffs are about “deal making” (somehow ignoring Trump’s longstanding obsession with the “beauty” of tariffs), Trump cannot compel immediate deals across the entirety of the international trading system.  Thus, the tariffs are likely to have a major impact on the American and other key world economies for at least the next year or two, if not substantially longer.

While Trump and MAGA vehemently disagree, arguing that an aggressive tariff regime moves the country back toward the economic veneration of blue collar Americans, most economists – right and left – have grave doubt about the success Trump’s gambit.  They point to profoundly negative economic impacts of past tariff schemes, including the impact of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs on the Great Depression.  They further argue that tariffs are unlikely to repatriate much manufacturing, all the while acting as a massive tax on the American consumer, who is likely to foot most of the tariff bill.*

Should the tariff regime result in negative economic impacts, Democrats are ready to pounce.  The term “Trumpcession” is already being bandied about.  And with Trump’s standing almost entirely premised on his economic reputation – both as a businessman and for presiding over a successful pre-Covid economy – Dems have good reason to believe that a rocky post-tariff economy will fall in Trump’s lap and put them in an incredible position to capitalize not just in the 2026 midterms but also in a 2028 general election, particularly should Republicans nominate another MAGA-affiliated politician such as Vice President JD Vance.

3.  Conclusion.

The election of Donald Trump, who brings out maximum passion in both his supporters and opponents, was likely to energize Democrats from now to the 2028 Presidential election.  That has already happened once, with Trump merely running a MAGA-centric but hardly revolutionary government.  Coupling Trump the lightning rod politician with a far-ranging tariff program bringing substantial economic risk, a recession or even weak American growth are likely to hail a massive Dem resurgence despite what was just a few months ago a bleak outlook.  Donald Trump remains the gift that keeps on giving, for his hardened supporters and diehard opposition alike.

*Following Covid, many on the American right are profoundly and somewhat understandably skeptical of the “expert class.”  That said, as someone viscerally opposed to the Covid response under Trump and Biden, the most likely place to find experts opposed to lockdowns and other restrictive measures taken by the US and other governments was the economics field.

Quick Hitters

1.  After Trump’s ill-fated meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in late February (in reality one tanked by JD Vance), the Trump Administration appeared poised to punish Ukraine for what it saw as ingratitude for past American assistance, going so far as to suspend aid and intelligence gathering for a time.  Since, however, the Administration has appeared to recognize that the biggest impediment to peace resides in the Kremlin, and is taking a harder line against what remains unprovoked Russian aggression.  It will be interesting to see how negotiations play out in the coming months and how the Trump Administration will proceed if Russia rejects a deal.

2.  Following the chaos unleashed by Covid, the United States experienced some real social ills, particularly among the most vulnerable populations in the country.  However, recent data shows massive improvement, mostly beginning in 2023 but accelerating in 2024 and 2025, on two key fronts – crime and drug overdose deaths.  At current pace, the 2025 homicide rate in the US may be 40% lower than it was in 2022.  Drug overdose deaths have declined by almost 30% since their high water mark in summer 2023 and appear poised to decline substantially further.  To say the least, Covid and the extreme response had a massive, long-term negative response that took nearly half a decade to shake.